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PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC. V. WELLES:
FORMER BUNNY'S USE OF TRADEMARKED
TERMS IS PERMISSIBLE, AS NO OTHER
PRACTICAL WAY TO DESCRIBE HER EXISTS
Evan Scheffelt
There is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe
herself and her services without venturing into absurd descriptive
phrases. To describe herself as the "nude model selected by Mr.
Hefner's magazine as its number-one prototypical woman for the
year 1981" would be impractical as well as ineffectual in
identifying Terri Welles to the public.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A trademark is a limited property right in a word, phrase, or
symbol which protects the identification of the source of a particular
good or service.2 One goal of trademark law is to prevent competitors
from misappropriating a rival's mark and capitalizing on its
goodwill.
When a trademark also describes a person, place, or attribute of
another's product, trademark law recognizes what is traditionally
known as the "fair use" defense.4 The fair use defense carves out an
exception to a trademark holder's exclusive use of a word, phrase, or
symbol in situations where a defendant uses that holder's mark fairly
and accurately to describe characteristics of its own goods or
5
services. Courts have held that a defendant relying on the fair use
defense must establish that its use is not likely to cause, or did not
f Lecturer, Department of Business Law, California State University, Northridge. The
author gratefully acknowledges Lisa A. Gallo, Esq. for her editorial assistance.
. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting the
district court in support of its affirmation of that court's granting of summary judgment).
2. See Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(quoting New Kids On The Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1991)).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1073-74.
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lead to, consumer confusion as to the identification of the source of
the goods or services in question.6
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized another
exception to a trademark holder's exclusive use of a word, phrase, or
symbol. 7 This different type of fair use, however, does not implicate
the source identification function, because there is no comparison of
marks.8 This type of fair use is described as a "nominative use."9 In a
nominative fair use scenario, the defendant is nominally using the
trademarked term because the plaintiffs trademark is the only word,
phrase, or symbol reasonably available to describe a particular good
or service, and because the defendant's use actually describes the
plaintiff's good or service rather than its own.'0
In the traditional fair use context, courts examine the similarity
of the mark used by the defendant to the plaintiff's protected
trademark to determine the likelihood of confusion." If the
likelihood of confusion exists, the defendant's use will be deemed
unfair.12 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the application
of the likelihood of confusion test in nominative use scenarios would
invariably lead to the incorrect conclusion, that virtually all
nominative uses are confusing because the defendant intends to use
the plaintiffs trademark to describe the plaintiffs goods or services. 13
In response, the Ninth Circuit adopted an alternative three-factor test
that more appropriately analyzes the likelihood of confusion in such
cases to determine whether that use is permissible.'
4
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, the defendant used
Playboy's trademarked terms on her Web site to describe herself as a
former "Playboy" model and "Playmate of the Year."'15 The Ninth
Circuit applied the nominative fair use test and concluded that
Welles' use of Playboy's trademarked terms was permissible when
there was no other practical way to describe herself as a recipient of
6. See id. at 1074 (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 911 F.2d
363, 366 (9th Cir. 1990)).
7. See id. at 1075 (citing New Kids On The Block, 971 F.2d at 308).
8. See Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075 (S.D. Cal.
1999).
9. Id.
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 1074.
12. See id. at 1074.
13. See id. at 1075 (citing New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308).
14. Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
15. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2002).
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those titles. 6 This Case Note examines the nominative fair use test
and its application in the Welles case.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1981, Terri Welles appeared as a cover model for Playboy
magazine and received the "Playboy Playmate of the Year" award.'
7
Many years later, she launched her own Web site in an effort to
promote her services as a spokesperson and model.' 8 Welles' Web
site offered free photographs of herself, advertised the sale of
additional photographs, solicited memberships in her photo club, and
promoted her spokesperson services.' 9 The biographical section of
the Web site described her status as a former Playboy model and as
Playmate of the Year in 1981.20
Playboy, as the owner of the registered trademarks "Playboy,"
"Playmate," and "Playmate of the Year," brought suit against
Welles, 2' alleging that the unauthorized use of its trademarks on
Welles' Web site constituted trademark infringement, dilution, unfair
competition, and breach of contract.22 Playboy based its complaint on
the following four uses by Welles of its trademarked terms: (1) the
terms "Playboy" and "Playmate," which appeared in the hidden
codes, or metatags, of the Web site; (2) the phrase "Playmate of the
Year 1981," which appeared on the headlines, or masthead, of the
Web site; (3) the phrases "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981" and
16. See id. at 800-01.
17. Id. at 799.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Playboy also named Terri Welles, Inc., Pippi, Inc., and Welles' Web designers,
Steven Huntington and Michael Mihalko, as defendants in the same suit. In this Case Note,
reference to Terri Welles includes all other named defendants.
22. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2002). Playboy alleged
breach of contract against only Pippi, Inc. on the ground that when Welles agreed to be
Playmate of the Year in 1981, Playboy and Pippi, Inc. executed a contract requiring Playboy's
advance written approval for Welles' "non-Playboy use of her name with the designation
'Playmate of the Year."' Id. Playboy further alleged that Pippi, Inc. was the alter ego of
Welles, despite the fact that Pippi, Inc. dissolved in 1984, rendering the contract enforceable
against Welles. Id. Welles also filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for
defamation, intentional interference with business advantage, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, unfair competition pursuant to CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17200, and declaratory relief.
Playboy filed a motion for summary judgment that was heard contemporaneously with Welles'
motion for summary judgment. Because of the complexity of the issues, the district court and
the Ninth Circuit resolved Playboy's motion for summary judgment on Welles' cross-complaint
in separate memoranda of decisions. Id. at 799; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles,
Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 n.l (S.D. Cal. 1999).
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"Playmate of the Year 1981," which appeared on banner links to other
Web sites; and (4) the use of the abbreviation "PMOY '81" as the
watermark, or wallpaper, that appeared on each of the Web site's
pages.23
Subsequent to Playboy's filing its lawsuit, Welles included
disclaimer language on her Web site stating that Playboy did not
endorse her Web site and acknowledging that "Playboy" and
"Playmate of the Year" were registered trademarks of Playboy
Enterprises, Inc.24 She then filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting that her descriptive use of the phrases "Playboy" and
"Playmate" on her Web site constituted fair use. 25 The district court
granted Welles' motion for summary judgment on Playboy's
infringement, dilution, and breach of contract claims, and Playboy
appealed.26 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted review on all
three issues.27
III. HOLDING, RATIONALE AND DISCUSSION
A. Trademark Infringement
The Ninth Circuit adopted an alternative fair use test in New
Kids On The Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.28 In New Kids,
band members claimed infringement when the defendant used their
trademarked band name "New Kids On The Block" to conduct
opinion polls to determine which members of the band were most
popular. 29 The New Kids court determined that the defendant's use of
the trademarked band name did not fit the traditional fair use scenario
because the defendant used the New Kids' trademark to reference the
band members themselves, rather than to describe the defendant's
own product.3°
Rather than modifying the test used in the traditional fair use
context, the New Kids court developed the nominative fair use
defense to permit a defendant's commercial use of another's
23. Welles, 279 F.3d at 800.
24. Id. at 799 and n.1.
25. See id. at 800.
26. Id.
27. Id. A discussion of the breach of contract claim is outside the scope of this Case Note.
However, as a matter of interest, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
declining to recognize Welles as the alter ego of Pippi, Inc.
28. New Kids On The Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (1992).
29. Id. at 304.
30. Id. at 308.
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trademark to describe the plaintiffs product, rather than its own. 3 1
The nominative fair use defense is available when the defendant
satisfies a three-prong test.
32
The first prong of the test requires that "the product or service in
question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the
trademark., 33 This occurs when "a trademark also describes a person,
a place, or an attribute of a product" and there is no description that
sufficiently substitutes for the trademarked term.34 This prong is
intended to prevent trademark holders from monopolizing
trademarked terms by asserting exclusive rights in them.35
The second prong of the test requires that "only so much of the
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the
product or service. 36 As an example, "a soft drink competitor would
be entitled to compare its product to Coca-Cola or Coke, but would
not be entitled to use Coca-Cola's distinctive lettering." 37
The third prong of the test requires "the user [to] do nothing that
would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder., 38 For example, a trademark
that describes a class of goods, such as an aspirin, as opposed to a
specific product, does not imply that the trademark holder sponsors or
endorses the product if the term has become generic.39
In Welles, similar to the New Kids court, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that Welles used the Playboy trademarks to describe
Playboy's awards and titles (rather than her own goods or services),
and therefore applied the nominative fair use test to determine if she
infringed on Playboy's trademarks.40
1. Headlines and Banner Links
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court properly
applied the nominative fair use test to conclude that the headline and
banner links did not infringe on Playboy's trademarks.4' It agreed
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. New Kids On The Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (1992).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 308.
37. Id. at 308 n.7.
38. Id. at 308.
39. Id. at 306 and n.4.
40. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801-02 (9th Cir. 2002).
41. Id. at 803.
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with the district court that the only reasonable way for Welles to
describe herself accurately on the Web site's headlines and banner
links was to use Playboy's trademarked terms.42 The circuit court
also concluded that the headline and banner links did not
unnecessarily use Playboy's trademarked terms, because they only
consisted of the trademarked words, not the distinctive fonts or
symbols that are associated with Playboy's trademarks.43 Further, the
circuit court held that the marks that appeared on the Web site did not
imply sponsorship or endorsement by Playboy because they were
clearly used solely to identify her as a former Playboy Playmate and
model, and because after the dispute arose, Welles placed disclaimers
on the Web site specifically disavowing any such endorsement or
sponsorship.44
2. Hidden Codes
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court also properly
concluded that the trademarked terms contained in the hidden codes
were nominative.45 With respect to the hidden codes, Welles could
not accurately describe herself or the content of her Web site without
referencing Playboy's trademarked terms.46 The court refused to
require Welles to use other less practical terms, reasoning that it
"would be particularly damaging in the internet search context"
because it would make it difficult or impossible for Internet users to
locate her Web site.47  Granting Playboy exclusive use of its
trademarked terms "would have the unwanted effect of hindering the
free flow of information on the internet, something which is certainly
not a goal of trademark law.' ' s
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the trademarked terms
were not excessively used in the hidden codes, which otherwise could
have caused Welles' Web site to regularly appear before Playboy's in
Internet searches. 49 Had that been the case, the Ninth Circuit noted, it
42. Id. at 802.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 803. The court specifically stated that it would express no opinion concerning
whether a defendant's use of a current title implies sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder. Id. at 803 n.25.
45. See id. at 803.
46. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2002).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 803-04.
49. Id. at 804.
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could have concluded differently.50  Lastly, the court found no
indication that the trademarked terms in the hidden codes endorsed or
sponsored Welles' Web site.51
3. Watermarks
With respect to the watermarks, the Ninth Circuit questioned
whether the PMOY abbreviation was entitled to trademark protection,
because the abbreviation itself was not a registered trademark.
52
Notwithstanding, Playboy argued that the PMOY abbreviation
deserved protection simply because it was a well-known abbreviation
of the trademarked term "Playmate of the Year.",53 The circuit court
remanded to the district court the issue of whether the PMOY
abbreviation was in fact a trademarked term.54 However, it implied
that Playboy's infringement claim with respect to the use of the
PMOY abbreviation might be moot if the PMOY abbreviation is not
trademarked.
In an effort to resolve this issue, the Ninth Circuit assumed, for
the sake of argument, that the PMOY abbreviation was a trademarked
term, and concluded that Welles' use of the abbreviation failed the
first prong of the nominative fair use test. 55  Not only did the
watermarks fail to identify Welles' name or likeness, but also her use
of the watermarks was unnecessary, because the term "Playboy
Playmate of the Year 1981" sufficiently described her status.56 The
court also stated that the watermarks were repeated uses of the
abbreviation and imitated Playboy's distinctive style.57
Because Welles' use of the PMOY abbreviation failed the first
prong, the Ninth Circuit did not apply her use of the abbreviation to
the second and third prongs of the test.
5 8
50. Id. at 803-04.
51. Id. at 804.
52. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 and n.32 (9th Cir. 2002).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 805.
55. Id. at 804.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2002).
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B. Nominative Uses Do Not Dilute Trademarks
The Ninth Circuit held "that nominative uses, by definition, do
not dilute ... trademarks" because the use refers to the trademark
holder's product rather than the user's product 9
Federal law protects against dilution when the trademark is
"famous" and another's use threatens its "distinctive quality."
60
Courts have defined dilution as "the gradual 'whittling away' of a
trademark's value., 61 A trademarked term is diluted when another's
use creates an "association" between the trademarked term and a
different product or service, resulting in the subsequent user's
capitalizing on the goodwill created by the trademark holder.6 2
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of Welles on Playboy's claim of
trademark dilution, with the exception of Welles' use of the PMOY
abbreviation. 63 The court reasoned that when Welles used Playboy's
trademarked terms to describe herself truthfully as a former award
recipient, she unquestionably referred to Playboy's award and title,
rather than to any product of her own.64  Therefore, Playboy's
trademarked terms were not diluted.65
IV. CONCLUSION
In Welles, the Ninth Circuit determined that a former Playboy
model's use of trademarked terms was permissible, nominative use.
The court applied the alternative nominative fair use test, as adopted
by the New Kids court, in this context because the former Playboy
model used certain trademarked terms to describe Playboy's award
and title, rather than to describe her own goods or services. However,
59. Id. at 806.
60. Id. at 805 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1) (2000)).
61. Id. (quoting Acad. of Motion Pictures Arts and Scis. v. Creative House Promotions,
Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted)).
62. Id. at 805 (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 24:70 (4th ed. 2001)). As an illustration, the Ninth Circuit explained that
dilution would occur if a cocoa maker used the trademarked term "Rolls Royce" to identify its
cocoa; the cocoa company would unfairly capitalize on the car company's earned reputation of
exceptional quality, even if there is no resulting confusion as to the origin of the trademarked
term. Id. at 805-06.
63. Id. at 806. The Ninth Circuit remanded the issue of dilution as to the PMOY
abbreviation for an initial determination of whether the PMOY abbreviation is entitled to
trademark protection. Id. The court noted that if the district court determines that the PMOY
abbreviation is not trademarked, there is no longer an issue of dilution. Id.
64. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002).
65. Id.
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remaining unresolved is the issue of whether the use of trademarked
terms by a current award recipient to describe status or title
constitutes nominative fair use.

